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Africa Is Arguing With Itself
On 1 January 2027, every bank, fintech and mobile money operator in Nigeria must have the payment transaction data it generates in the country stored and managed on local servers. The Central Bank of Nigeria issued the circular in June, signed by Dr Rakiya O. Yusuf, director of its payment system supervision department, and it has not moved.
Four weeks before that deadline, a different clock runs out. At its 39th Ordinary Session in February, the African Union Assembly asked member states to complete ratification of the AfCFTA Digital Trade Protocol and four other instruments by the end of 2026. That Protocol contains an article on cross-border data transfers which permits restrictions for legitimate public policy objectives, provided they do not restrict transfers more than is necessary to achieve them.
“It’s about our sovereignty, it’s about clarity, it’s about visibility over our production data,” Yusuf said of the requirement.
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The position from Cape Town
At the Africa Tech Festival this week, a view surfaced across several sessions that cuts against where a growing number of African regulators are heading. Contributors warned that rigid localisation and fragmented regulation can weaken innovation and services, in a continent already short of fibre, running underused data centres and constrained by power. Data sovereignty, on that argument, is a question of governance, ownership and lineage rather than mere local residency.
The argument itself is not new, but it has rarely been put so squarely at an African industry event. It holds that keeping a copy of a database inside a national border achieves very little if the organisation cannot say who touched the data, where it came from, what it was used for and who may be held to account. Residency is a storage fact. Sovereignty, on this reading, is a governance fact, and the two can come apart entirely.
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The counter-argument is being written into law at speed.
Bringing it home
Nigeria’s directive is the sharpest instance because it has a date attached and the date is close.
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The compliance picture is uncomfortable. A survey conducted by the National Information Technology Development Agency and the Central Bank found that only 59 per cent of financial institutions were ready for the January deadline. Institutions have to identify and classify affected workloads, review technology contracts, map dependencies and in some cases redesign cloud-based applications, all without interrupting service.
Industry voices have asked for the scope to be clearer. Ikechukwu Nnamani, chief executive of Digital Realty Nigeria, has argued that “the processing of some of their data needs to be localised,” not merely the storage — a distinction that changes the engineering problem considerably. Lars Johannisson, chief executive of Rack Centre, has urged institutions to “engage as early as possible NITDA to get the clarification.”
Yusuf has signalled both patience and limits. “Everybody is hand-holding to be able to achieve the compliance with the regulation,” she said, before adding that “where we see that there’s a deliberate attempt, of course sanctions will come.”
Ghana has gone further in one respect. The Bank of Ghana’s Cyber and Information Security Directive, launched this year to replace the 2018 original, requires sensitive financial information to be stored physically inside Ghana and keeps core systems and critical data within national borders. Only non-sensitive front-end services may sit in the cloud, and then under an approved, risk-based framework. The directive rests on the Cybersecurity Act of 2020 and the Data Protection Act of 2012.
Governor Johnson Asiama framed the purpose as “safeguarding the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the data that powers our economy.”
Rwanda enforces data residency rules of its own. Kenya’s government cloud policy keeps state data in the country.
Sending it out
The instruments pointing the other way are newer and softer, which is exactly the problem.
The AfCFTA Digital Trade Protocol was adopted by the AU Assembly in Addis Ababa in February 2024. Eight annexes followed a year later, among them an annex on cross-border data transfers, alongside annexes on digital identities, cross-border digital payments, source code disclosure and financial technology. The Protocol’s provision on transfers permits them for digital trade conducted by a person of a state party, with restrictions allowed for legitimate public policy or essential security interests — but requiring that those restrictions not be arbitrary, not amount to a disguised restriction on trade, and not go beyond what is necessary.
Kenya, meanwhile, has spent the year building the interoperability case in practice. Its Office of the Data Protection Commissioner published a Guidance Note on Cross-border Data Transfers in April, setting out adequacy determinations, transfer agreements and risk assessments, and stating that the framework exists so organisations can “engage in global operations while remaining compliant with the Act.” It accepts that legitimate interest may support hosting data on cloud servers outside the country for efficiency.
On Monday, Kenya and the European Union concluded negotiations on mutual data adequacy, which, once both sides adopt their decisions, would be the first such arrangement between the EU and an African country.
The split is not between countries
Here is the part that has gone unwritten. The two camps are not Nigeria and Ghana on one side and Kenya on the other. The division runs straight through the middle of individual governments, including Kenya’s.
The same Act that underpins Kenya’s cross-border guidance contains section 50, which requires personal data processed for the strategic interests of the state to be domiciled in Kenya. Regulation 26 fills in what that means: civil registration, elections, public finance systems, protected computer systems, education, and primary and secondary health care. An organisation handling that data must process it through a server and data centre in Kenya, or keep at least one serving copy in a Kenyan data centre.
So the office that spent two years negotiating free movement of data with Brussels is the same office that administers a hard localisation mandate across most of what the Kenyan state does. Both positions are defensible. They are not the same position.
Nigeria is in the same bind from the other end. It is a party to the continental free trade agreement whose digital protocol constrains unnecessary restrictions on data transfers, while its central bank implements one of the firmer localisation mandates on the continent. Neither institution is acting improperly. They are simply not solving for the same thing, and no one has been asked to reconcile them.
The dependency nobody has checked
There is a structural weakness in the interoperability route that deserves more attention than it gets.
Kenya’s cross-border guidance treats ratification of the African Union’s Malabo Convention as one indicator that a destination country offers appropriate safeguards, though it is careful to say ratification does not automatically approve a transfer and that the Commissioner assesses each case.
Malabo entered into force in June 2023. By early this year it had been ratified by 16 of 55 member states — as this publication reported on Wednesday. Nigeria is not among them. Neither is South Africa, nor Egypt, nor Morocco, nor Kenya itself.
Which means a Kenyan mechanism designed to ease data movement across Africa leans partly on a treaty that Kenya’s largest African trading partners have not signed. The continental route to interoperability runs through a document most of the continent has declined to adopt.
That is the gap the AU Assembly was trying to close when it set the end of 2026 as the ratification target. Six weeks remain.
What this costs
The argument is not academic for anyone running a payments business across more than one African market.
A fintech operating in Nigeria, Ghana and Kenya now faces three different answers to the same question about where a transaction record may sit, enforced by three different regulators with three different definitions of what is sensitive. Nigeria’s test is payment transaction data generated in the country. Ghana’s is sensitive financial information and core systems. Kenya’s is data processed for the strategic interests of the state, defined by a list.
None of those definitions maps onto the others. A compliance architecture built for one of them will not satisfy the other two, and the cost of running three falls hardest on the companies the continent says it wants — the ones trying to operate across borders rather than inside one.
What to watch
Three markers over the next quarter will show which way this is settling.
Whether the Central Bank of Nigeria holds the 1 January date or grants a transition period, given that two in five institutions were reported unready. Whether any significant number of member states deposit ratifications of the Digital Trade Protocol before the AU’s end-of-year target, or whether the deadline passes the way continental deadlines often do. And whether a single African government publishes a position reconciling its localisation rules with its digital trade commitments, rather than leaving two agencies to pursue both at once.
The Cape Town argument was that sovereignty is about lineage, accountability and control rather than postcode. It is a good argument. It is losing.